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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Is the Order of October 9, 1985, res judicata and

does it preclude the Order of March 19, 1986?
2.

Did the District Court commit reversible error in

adopting the recommendations of Domestic Relations Commissioner
Peuler without permitting the defendant/appellant an evidentiary
hearing?
3.

Is the Order of March 19, 1986, erroneous in any

event in construing or modifying the Decree of Divorce to give
plaintiff the first option to acquire the family residence at the
1975 appraised value?
STATEMENT OF THE CASfe
This is a post-judgment proceeding.

These proceedings

were commenced with an Affidavit for an Order to Show Cause
verified and filed by the plaintiff April 15, 1985. (R.42-43)
Shortly thereafter the defendant made a Motiion for Clarification
of Decree filed April 26, 1985, (R.45-46) which motion was amended

May 1, 198 5, (R.47-48)

The Order to Show Cause and the Amended

Motion for Clarification were heard by Commissioner Peuler on May
7, 1985, and taken under advisement. (R.49)

(It should be noted

that apparently plaintiff's original Motion for Clarification
through a mistake on the calendar came on for hearing on May 9,
1985, and was stricken as neither counsel appeared. R.66)

The

Affidavit and the Motion dealt with the option to purchase the
family home as set forth in paragraph 2(b) of the Stipulation
executed by the parties and their attorneys on November 6, 1975,
(R.15-17), and the said provision was incorporated in the Findings
of Fact as paragraph 7 (R.23-26) and in the Decree of Divorce as
paragraph 5. (R.20-22)
On August 23, 1985, the Commissioner ruled on the
matters which she had taken under advisement and denied the Order
to Show Cause brought by the plaintiff for the reason that there
was a failure to show that defendant had failed to exercise his
option pursuant to the Stipulation. (R.51)

No objections were

ever made or filed by the plaintiff or her counsel, either to the
recommendation or to the October 9th Order.

After the time of the

argument of the Order to Show Cause plaintiff's counsel, Nolan J.
Olsen, withdrew as counsel July 19, 1985, (R.50), and Frank
Pignanelli appeared September 13, 1985, as counsel for plaintiff.
(R.54) although he had apparently advised Commissioner Peuler of
his appearance as early as August 23, 1985, as his name appears on
the Memorandum Decision. (R.51)

-2-

On September 23, 1985, (after the recommendation noted
above and before the October 9 Order) plaintiff filed a new
petition entitled "Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute
Quit-Claim Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree," (R.57)
Defendant filed opposing Affidavits—one signed by defendant and
the other by defense counsel, Leland K. Wilder (R.70-73), and
that matter was thereafter heard September 30, 1985, and the
Commissioner took the matter under advisement and made a
recommendation later the same day and mailed it out to counsel
October 1, 1985.

(R.76-77)

An Objection was timely filed to that

recommendation October 3, 1985. (R.79)

Th^n followed the October

9th Order referred to hereinabove, and the said Verified Motion to
Compel came before the Honorable David B. Dee on November 6, 198 5.
(R.84)

On that occasion Mr. Pignanelli, the plaintiff and

plaintiff's husband appeared, as did defendant, with his
attorneys, Mr. Wimmer and Mr. Madsen.
invited into the Judge's chambers.

The aforesaid persons were

Judge Dee stated that he

thought this was a default divorce, that his clerk was sick and
that he did not have the file in this matter.

There was

apparently no court reporter available, however, the judge's
bailiff was on duty.

The judge then stateq that it was his

general policy to uphold Commissioner Peul^r in every instance and
stated in substance, "Why should we pay her (stating an amount)
and then not follow her^recommendations?"

Mr. Madsen then stated

in substance that when a recommendation is rejected, it is the
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duty of the judge to hear the matter and exercise his judgment.
Counsel for the defendant then handed Judge Dee copies of some of
the relevant documents from their own file (which documents have
apparently been included in the court file at pages R.86-89).
Judge Dee then informed the parties that he would not proceed
further that day, but that he would obtain the file and review it.
No other hearing was ever granted.
Defendant was never afforded any further hearing, but
several weeks later Judge Dee's clerk, Brad Willis, notified Kent
Wimmer that the Court had ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
Findings, Conclusions and a proposed Decree were then drafted by
Mr. Pignanelli and submitted to counsel for the defendant.
Counsel for defendant objected in writing to the same (R.90-91) on
the grounds that there had been no evidentiary hearing and no
findings could be made.

Those Findings and Conclusions have

apparently never been placed in the file and were apparently never
signed by the judge.

The Court nevertheless signed an Order on

March 19, 1986, from which this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because there was no evidentiary hearing, there is no
transcript of testimony.

There is also no transcript of argument

as no argument on the merits was ever permitted, and there was no
court reporter present to even record the exchange between counsel
and Judge Dee on November 6, 1985.
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The primary matter to be considered in this action is
the language of the original Stipulation, Findings of Fact and
Decree of Divorce noted above, (R.15-17, R.20-22, R.23-26) which
documents are set forth in full in the Addendum at the end of this
brief.

The language as it relates to the issue in this matter in

the Stipulation, Findings and Decree is substantially the same,
and we quote from paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce as follows:
"Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded the use of
the home and real property located at 13227 South 2860
West, Riverton, Utah, subject to the payment of the
mortgage thereon, until the occurrence of one of the
following contingencies, to-wit: The remarriage of
plaintiff, the youngest child reaches majority, or
plaintiff desires to sell said home, at which time
defendant shall have first option to purchase
plaintiff's equity pursuant to an appraisal to be made
forthwith to determine the equity as of this date, said
appraisal to be paid for by defendant^ and plaintiff
shall have the option to purchase defendant's equity on
the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the
event defendant does not purchase plaintiff's equity,
said equity to be based on an appraisal and
determination as of the date of the occurrence of one of
the above contingencies. In the event neither party
exercises the option to purchase, the home shall be sold
and defendant shall receive the equit^ pursuant to the
Decree of Divorce and the present appraisal."
Commissioner Peuler's Memorandum of August 23, 1985, and
Judge Dee's Order of October 9, 1985, (botl^ of which are included
in the Addendum hereto) affirm in effect tfte clear language of the
said Decree of Divorce and further declare that there is no
evidence that defendant failed to exercise his option, which
option is a first option as set forth in the Decree.

The second

Memorandum Decision of Commissioner Peuler of September 30, 1985,
and the Order of Judge Dee of March 19, 1986, (both of which are
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included in said Addendum) totally rewrite the language of
paragraph 5 of the Decreee of Divorce in that the said Order gives
plaintiff the first option to acquire defendant's equity at the
lower appraised value existing in 1975.
Attached to the verified Motion to Compel of the
plaintiff was an Exhibit Af (these documents are also included in
the Addendum hereto) which consisted of a draft of an early
Stipulation which was prepared prior to the entry of the Decree of
Divorce.

The said Stipulation was never signed by anybody and was

rejected by defendant at the time of the negotiations preceding
the execution of the Stipulation of November 6, 1975f (R.15) and
entry of the Decree of Divorce.

The rejected Stipulation, as it

relates to the matter of options on the family residence, differs
from the wording of the executed Stipulation in that the terms
"defendant" and "plaintiff" are reversed in six instances.

That

Stipulation, however was never signed, and the Stipulation that
was signed (R.15) gives the defendant the first option.

It is

that executed Stipulation (R.15) which is incorporated in
paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce.
It should also be noted that the unexecuted Stipulation
also varies in other respects from the Stipulation finally signed,
such as the in amount of child support and attorney's fees.

The

uncontroverted Affidavit of Leland Kent Wimmer (R.72-73) categorically states that there were no ambiguities or typographical
errors in the drafting of the executed Stipulation, which was
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incorporated in the Decree.

Likewise, the Affidavit of the

defendant (R.70) states that the Stipulation actually signed by
the parties resulted from many hours of discussion with the
plaintiff and that it was not the result of any typographical
errors.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

The Order signed by Judge Dee on October 9,

1985, is res judicata and precludes entry of the Order of March
19, 1986, for the reason that the relief sought in the Order to
Show Cause and the relief sought in the Motion to Compel are in
the main identical and, although the Motion to Compel is somewhat
broader than the Order to Show Cause, all additional issues
existed at the time of the bringing of the Order to Show Cause and
could and should have been included therein, and are determined
and disposed of by that Order.

Also, the Order dismissing the

Order to Show Cause in effect affirms the obvious meaning of the
Decree of Divorce wherein it affirms that the defendant had the
first option to acquire the home and has not waived the same.

The

Motion to Compel is nothing more than an improper attempt to
circumvent the Order entered on the Order to Show Cause.
POINT II.

The defendant was in any event entitled to an

evidentiary hearing on the Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to
Execute Quit-Claim Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree.
Even if the Court should find that the Motion to Compel is not
precluded by doctrines of res judicata, defendant (having rejected
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Commissioner Peuler's recommendation pursuant to Rule 8 of the
Rules of the Third District Court) is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on all of the matters raised in the said Motion to Compel.
Such a hearing was not afforded the defendant.

By the terms of

the original Decree of Divorce, the defendant was given a
substantial property right in the form of a first option to
acquire the property at its value at the time of the Decree of
Divorce.

The District Court has now taken away that right from

the defendant without giving the defendant an opportunity to have
an evidentiary hearing on the matter, and thereby defendant has
been denied due process of law.
POINT III.

Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce is

clear and unambiguous and not subject to being interpreted by
parol evidence or by any considerations outside of the Decree, and
furthermore, paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce is not subject
to modification on any of the grounds alleged in the Order to Show
Cause or Motion to Compel.

There is no allegation of a material

change of circumstances; the Decree resulted from a prolonged
sequence of negotiations culminating in the execution by both
parties and their counsel of a Stipulation which was approved by
the court and incorporated in Findings of Fact and in the Decree
of Divorce in 1975.
The said Decree is clear and unambiguous, and its
meaning can be determined from the four corners of the Decree.
Furthermore, no proceeding under Rule 60(b) has ever been
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undertaken by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's "intent,"
"understanding," and "belief" are irrelevant; the Stipulation,
Findings and Decree were not the result of typographical errors;
alleged "standard practice" was neither established, nor is it
relevant; and the Decree cannot be modified at this date because
of plaintiff's present feeling that it is "unfair."

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE ORDER SIGNED BY JUDGE DEE ON OCTOBER 9,

1985, IS RES JUDICATA AND PRECLUDES ENTRY OF THE ORDER OF MARCH
19, 1986.
The Order to Show Cause filed herein on April 15, 1985,
(R.42) (copy of which is included in Addendum hereto) asked the
court to interpret the Decree of Divorce entered herein on
November 21, 1975, (R.20) as granting to the defendant an equity
in the home in question in the amount of $8,408.89 (together with
one-half of the value of water stock amounting to $112.50 for a
total of $8,521.39 and to require the defendant to execute a quitclaim deed to the plaintiff upon receipt of said sum.

The said

Order of October 9, 1985, (R.80) denied said relief.
The Order of March 19, 1986, (R.93) purports to grant
to plaintiff the identical relief denied her by the prior Order of
October 9, 1985.
It is true that the plaintiff's Verified Motion to
Compel Defendant to Execute Quit-Claim Deed and Requesting
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Clarification of Decree (copy is included in Addendum hereto)
expands somewhat upon the grounds asserted in the Order to Show
Cause.

The Order to Show Cause basically asks the Court to

interpret the Decree a certain way, and the Verified Motion to
Compel also requests the Court to do the same, but goes beyond
that and says in effect that the plaintiff signed the wrong
Stipulation, apparently by mistake, and goes on to set forth what
her understanding of the proper Stipulation was.
The said motion also raises the issue as to whether or
not defendant waived his first option.

Nevertheless, all of those

matters could have been raised in the initial Order to Show Cause.
The alleged waiver relating to an offer of sale by plaintiff, for
example, dates back to August 10, 1981, four years before the said
Order to Show Cause was filed.

It is axiomatic that a matter

which could have been raised in the Order to Show Cause is barred
by ruling on the Order to Show Cause and becomes res judicata with
respect to that subject matter.
We cite in support of the foregoing proposition
Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P2d 379 (Utah 1974), where the
court stated at page 380 the following:
"In Wheadon v. Pearson this court stated that the
doctrine of res judicata applied not only to points and
issues which were actually raised and decided in a prior
action but also as to those that could have been
adjudicated, with the qualification that the claim,
demand, or cause be the same in both cases. If the
parties have had an opportunity to present their case
and judgment is rendered thereon, it is binding both as
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to those issues that were tried and to those that were
triable in that proceeding, and they are precluded from
further litigating the matter."
See also Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 580 P2d 243
(Utah 1978), and Penrod v. New Creation Cream, 669 P2d 873 (Utah
1983) •
Likewise plaintifffs alleged remarriage on March 26,
1984, asserted as a waiver, was a matter that could have been
raised in the original Order to Show Cause, but was not.

It

should be noted that paragraph 18 of the Motion to Compel is
virtually identical with paragraph 3 of the Order to Show Cause.
The motion also refers to "standard practice," which is
entirely irrelevant, and also speaks in terms of "unfairness,"
which likewise is not a matter that can be canvassed at this late
date.
We cite in support Christensen v. Christensen, 619 P2d
1372 (Utah 1980), which stated:
" . . . we cannot now upset a stipulated property
settlement because of her having relied upon values
furnished by her husband in an adversary proceeding or
because she was without funds to hire an appraiser of
her own."
Also, we cite Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P2d 412, (Utah
1981).

In that case the court stated:

"Where a disposition of real property is in
question . . . the court should properly be more
reluctant to grant a modification. In the interest of
securing stability in titles, modifications in a decree
of divorce making disposition of real property are to be
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granted only upon a showing of compelling reasons
arising from a substantial and material change in
circumstances.
"The above holds true a fortiori where the property
disposition is the product of an agreement and
stipulation between the parties, and sanctioned by the
trial court. Such a provision is the product of an
agreement bargained for by the parties. As such the
trial court should subsequently modify such a provision
only with great reluctance and based upon compelling
reasons."
No such reasons have been advanced in this case, and
the clear wording of the Decree of Divorce is not subject to
modification ten years after the Decree was entered.
It should be further noted that Lf plaintiff's
contention is true, (that the word "plaintiff" and the word
"defendant" were in the six instances interchanged), then
plaintiff has the first option and defendant has no option to be
waived.

In order for defendant to have anything to waive, it must

be conceded that the Decree means what it says and that the
defendant had the first option.

(If the Court should find that

the language is clear and that defendant had the first option, but
waived it, then the Order of March 19, 1986, is erroneous in any
event because in that circumstance defendant would at least be
entitled to one-half of the current equity.
The clear and unequivocal meaning of paragraph 5 of the
Decree of Divorce (R.20) is simply this:

That plaintiff is

granted the "use" of the home and is to pay the very modest
mortgage payment thereon of $125 per month for such use.
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When

plaintiff remarries, or the youngest child reaches majority, or
plaintiff desires to sell the home, defendant is given the option
to acquire the home by paying to plaintiff her equity in the home
determined by an appraisal at the time of the Decree of Divorce.
If he does not elect to acquire the home, then the plaintiff is
granted the option to acquire the home by paying the defendant his
equity, which equity is in that event to be determined at a later
date, being the time that plaintiff remarries, the youngest child
reaches majority, or plaintiff desires to sell the home.

The

Decree goes on to provide what will take place if neither party
desires to acquire the home, but that provision is irrelevant to
this proceeding as it is clear that both parties desire to acquire
the home.
The Order to Show Cause of the plaintiff filed on April
15, 1985, (R.42) purports to interpret paragraph 5 of the
aforesaid Decree of Divorce in two respects, both of which are
erroneous.

First, it presupposes that the defendant has waived

his first option and goes on to assume that even if he has waived
it, that plaintiff has the right to acquire his interest at the
1975 value.

The fact of the matter is that, even if the defendant

had waived his option to purchase her equity at the 1975 value,
she only has the right to acquire his equity at the later value at
the time of the occurrence of one of the contingencies.
Defendant's equity in the property at the later date would be
computed as follows:

The property was worth approximately $70,000
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at the occurrence of the first contingency and there was a balance
owing on the mortgage at that time of approximately $14,000,

a

difference of $56,000, and defendant's one-half would be $28,000,
an increase to him (over plaintiff's offer) of about $19,500.
In any event that was the relief sought by the plaintiff
in the said Order to Show Cause.

That matter was heard before

Commissioner Peuler on May 7, 1985, (R.49) at which time the
Commissioner took the matter under advisement and rendered her
recommendation on August 23, 1985, (R.51).

The Order of the Court

incorporating her recommendation (no objection having been made by
the plaintiff) with approval endorsed thereon by Commissioner
Peuler was signed and entered by Judge Dee on October 9, 1985.
(R.80)
Subsequent to Commissioner Peulerfs making said
recommendation on August 23, 1985, the plaintiff attempted to
circumvent that ruling by filing what she termed a "Verified
Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute Quit-Claim Deed and
Requesting Clarification of Decree.

In said motion the plaintiff

sought to have the Court interpret the aforesaid Decree of Divorce
in the same manner as the plaintiff had sought in her Order to
Show Cause, to-wit, she wanted the Court to interpret the Decree
as providing that the plaintiff had the first right to acquire the
property from the defendant by payment to him of one-half the
value of the property as of the date of the Decree of Divorce.
The said motion was filed on September 23, 1985, subsequent to the
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recommendation of Commissioner Peuler on August 23, 1985,
recommending denial of the Order to Show Cause.
We respectfully submit that a party cannot circumvent
the recommendation of the Commissioner and subsequent decision of
the Court based thereon by the simple expedient of filing another
proceeding under a different title, but containing a request for
the identical relief.
POINT II.

THE DEFENDANT WAS IN ANY EVENT ENTITLED TO AN

EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE VERIFIED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO
EXECUTE QUIT-CLAIM DEED AND REQUESTING CLARIFICATION OF DECREE.
Even if the Court should feel that the relief sought in
the "Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute Quit-Claim
Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree" (R.57) is not
precluded by the Court's Order of October 9, 1985, defendant was
nevertheless entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on said
petition, which defendant has been denied.
The Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute QuitClaim Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree was filed on
September 23, 1985, and was heard before Commissioner Peuler on
September 30, 1985, at which time the matter was taken under
advisement by her.

Apparently later on that day the Commissioner

reached her decision and filed a Memorandum Decision dated
September 30, 1985, which she mailed to counsel the next day,
October 1, 1985.

On October 3, 1985, the defendant filed an

Objection and demand for further hearing (R.79), and the
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said request constituted a timely and proper request for a full
hearing before Judge David B. Dee, defendant having thus rejected
the recommendation of the Commissioner,

See Rule 8 of the Third

District Court Rules in the Addendum hereto.
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel was indeed noticed up for
hearing before Judge Dee on the 6th day of November, 1985.

On

that occasion, as noted before, Mr. Pignanelli and the plaintiff
and plaintiff's husband appeared, as did the defendant and his
attorneys.

The aforesaid persons, being six in all, were invited

into the judge's chambers.

As noted above, he initially stated

that he thought this was a default divorce case, that his clerk
was sick and he did not have the file.

The judge then stated in

substance that it is his general policy to uphold the Commissioner
in every instance, suggesting that why else was she on the
payroll.

Counsel for the defendant requested a hearing (pursuant

to said Rule 8 as the Commissioner's recommendation had been
timely rejected) and, although entitled to such a hearing under
said Rule 8, no such hearing was afforded.

The Court accepted

copies of several of the documents inasmuch as he did not have the
file and said that he would get the file and look it over.

It is*

clear from the foregoing that the defendant was never granted an
appropriate hearing in the premises and was denied due process of
law as vested property rights were taken from the defendant
without just cause and without a hearing.

The defendant was

entitled to have the Court hear testimony on all issues, including
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the issue of waiver and to hear testimony on the meaning of the
Decree should it be determined that the Decree was in any way
ambiguous.

No record was made of the proceedings, no court

reporter was present, nor any recording device.

The whole episode

took place in chambers, and in the context of the Court's
statement that he always upheld Commissioner Peuler1
recommendations.
POINT III.

PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IS

CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION ON ANY
OF THE GROUNDS ALLEGED IN EITHER THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE OR THE
MOTION TO COMPEL.
It is the contention of the defendant that even if the
decree of October 9, 1985, is not res judicata as to the Order of
March 19, 1986, and even if defendant had been afforded an
appropriate evidentiary hearing, paragraph 5 of the Decree of
Divorce is clear and unambiguous and is not subject to change upon
any of the grounds alleged in either the Order to Show Cause of
the Verified Motion to Compel.

We will canvass the grounds

separately:
1.

In the Order to Show Cause no ground is given

except that it is asserted that the Decree of Divorce is subject
to an interpretation as claimed by the plaintiff.

A fair reading

of the Decree shows that that claim is entirely inaccurate.

The

Decree, as it relates to the option of the defendant and the
option of the plaintiff (which are the only items at issue) is
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entirely clear.

Under established law, where the Decree is clear,

no clarification or explanatory testimony is acceptable, and the
Court is required to enforce the document according to its clear
meaning as ascertained from the four corners of the Decree.
In Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign Company,
586 P2d 446 (Utah 1978), the Supreme Court stated at page 450:
"If the language of a judgment be clear and
unambiguous, it must be enforced as it speaks. However,
when the meaning is obscure or ambiguous, the entire
record may be resorted to for the purpose of construing
the judgment."
The Supreme Court of Utah stated in Larsen v. Larsen,
561 P2d 1077 (Utah 1977), at page 1079 as follows:
"Mrs. Larsen did not appeal from the decree, and
neither she nor the state have proceeded under Rule
60(b), U.R.C.P., to obtain relief from the decree.
Furthermore, the trial court specifically found the
support obligation was just and proper . . . "
In this case plaintiff did not appeal the decision, has
not proceeded under Rule 60(b) and, as in the Larsen case, the
court specifically found in Finding No. 7 (R.23) that the
provision for distribution of the house was "fair and reasonable."
Even if the plaintiff had grounds to vacate the Decree
under Rule 60(b), such proceeding would have to be brought within
three months after the entry of the Decree if it is to be done in
the same action.

Although Rule 60(b) seems to indicate that a

separate action may be permissible, none has been brought in this
case, and the plaintiff would probably be precluded from doing so
in any event by laches.
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2.

Plaintiff's "intent" or plaintiff's "understanding"

or plaintiff's "belief" was that defendant would not have a first
option (see paragraphs 6, 7 & 8 of Verified Motion to Compel-R.58)
The subjective intent, understanding or belief of a
party is irrelevant once a stipulation has been negotiated, signed
by the parties and their attorneys, approved by the court, and
entered in the Decree of Divorce.
In Land v. Land, 605 P2d 1248 (Utah 1980), the Court
stated the following at page 1251:
" . . . when a decree is based upon a property
settlement agreement, forged by the parties and
sanctioned by the court, equity must take such agreement
into consideration. Equity is not available to
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted
away simply because one has come to regret the bargain
made. Accordingly the law limits the continuing
jurisdiction of the court where property settlement
agreement has been incorporated into the decree, and the
outright abrogation of the provisions of such agreement
is only to be resorted to with great reluctance and for
compelling reasons."
See also Despain v. Despain, 627 P2d 526 (Utah 1981),
and Lea v. Bowers, 658 P2d 1213 (Utah 1983)|.
It is well-established that in the interpretation of
contracts, as well as judicial instruments, subjective intention
is irrelevant, and the documents are to be given the fair meaning
which an objective reading thereof yields.
3.

Plaintiff alleges that there were "typographical

errors" in the Decree of Divorce.
verified motion.

See paragraph 10 of said

It is clear that we are here not dealing with
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"typographical errors," but rather with the desire of the
plaintiff to have the court rewrite the Decree of Divorce in
accordance with the provisions of the rejected and unsigned
Stipulation.

In order to have the Decree of Divorce conform to

that Stipulation, the word "defendant" in paragraph 5 of the
Decree would have to be changed to "plaintiff" three times, and
the word "plaintiff" would have to be changed to "defendant" three
times.

Six changes in all, and that is certainly more than a

typographical error.

Furthermore, if the appropriate changes were

then made in the Findings of Fact and in the original Stipulation,
at least 18 changes would have to be made, and it is clear that we
are not dealing with any kind of typographical or clerical error.
Furthermore, although plaintiff attempts to put the
blame on Attorney Nolan Olsen for not carrying out her
instructions, it must be noted that the plaintiff's own signature
is on the Stipulation which was finally signed by the parties and
their attorneys (R.15-17), and it is upon that Stipulation that
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R.23-26) and Decree of
Divorce (R.20-22) were based.
It should also be noted that the divorce was obtained by
plaintiff, and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce were drafted by plaintiff's own attorney, not
defendant's.

It is not realistic to suppose that the parties made

18 errors through oversight.

The Stipulation, Findings and Decree
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were drafted as they were because that was the negotiated
agreement of the parties as approved by the court,
4.

In paragraph 24 of the Motion to Compel plaintiff

asserts that there is a "standard practice" in these matters,
which standard practice in her belief would have lead to a
different agreement.

We do not believe that there is any standard

practice in this matter, but in any event, it is the agreement of
the parties as approved by the Court that is determinative, not
any such standard practice.

This is just another way of saying

that the Decree does not conform with plaintiff's present desires
and she wished now to have the Court rewrite the Decree in
accordance with some theoretical "standard practice."

As noted in

the Land case above, this is not permissi bie.
5.
written.

The plaintiff claims that the Decree is "unfair" as

(See paragraph 25 of the Motion to Compel.)

This of

course constitutes no basis for a modification of the Decree of
Divorce as noted in the Land case, supra.

It is axiomatic that a

Decree of Divorce can only be modified upon a material, permanent
change of circumstances, and not because the plaintiff—ten years
after entry of the Decree—claims that it is unfair.
6.
Decree.

The plaintiff asks that the Court clarify the

See paragraph 26 (R.62).

As noted above, clarification

of a Decree may be appropriate where the language is ambiguous,
but where the language is clear, no such interpretation is
permitted.

If the plaintiff is using the word "clarify" in the
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sense of asking the Court to enforce the order as written, then
such a request is no doubt appropriate, but if the Decree is to be
enforced as written, then it is defendant who has the first option
to purchase the property, not the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
It is defendant's position that the Order of the Court
of October 9, 1986, denying plaintiff's Order to Show Cause is res
judicata and determinative of the issues in this action, and that
it precludes the Order of March 19, 1986.

Even if the foregoing

position is rejected, it is clear that defendant timely objected
to the recommendation of Commissioner Peuler and requested a
hearing and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing before Judge
Dee with a court reporter present and a record kept of the
proceedings.

It is the position of the defendant that the Court

could have denied plaintiff relief based upon the doctrine of res
judicata, but before the Court could rule for the plaintiff, it
would be necessary to hear evidence on all of the conflicting
factual assertions.

That is certainly true if the plaintiff is to

be permitted to get into matters such as her "intention," her
"belief," her "understanding," "typographical errors," "standard
practice," "unfairness" and the like.

So, at the very least, if

the foregoing assertions of the plaintiff are to be entertained by
the Court, defendant is entitled to put on his evidence and
testimony with respect to each of those matters.
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Finally, it is defendant's position that none of the
aforesaid matters could appropriately be canvassed by the Court at
this late date and that, had the matter been heard, the Court
would be compelled as a matter of law to overrule the contentions
of the plaintiff and rule in favor of the defendant in any event.
We respectfully submit that this Court can and should rule against
the plaintiff as a matter of law, but if defendant is in error in
that belief, then at least defendant is entitled to his day in
court with respect to any factual issues which the Court believes
could properly be raised by the plaintiff ten years after entry of
the Decree.
For the aforesaid reasons, it is the position of the
defendant that the aforesaid Decree of Divorce does grant the
defendant a first option, that the language of the Decree is clear
and unequivocal and should be enforced as written, and that no
extraneous evidence is necessary or proper.
Respectfully submitted,

LELAND KENT WIMMER
GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
KIM CLEGG

-23-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief with
Addendum were mailed to Frank R. Pignanelli, attorney for
defendant/respondent, at his address, 48 Post Office Place, 3rd
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, postage prepaid, this

day of August, 1986.

Attorney Eor Defendant
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ADDENDUM
Items in the Addendum are referred to by the same page
numbers as in the Record and in the same order.
Contents of Addendum:
Stipulation, R.15-17.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, R.23-26.
Decree of Divorce, R.20-22.
Affidavit for Order to Show Cause, R.42-43.
Recommendation (August 23, 1983), R.51.
Verified Motion to Compel, R.57-69.
Recommendation (September 30, 1985), R.76-77.
Order, R.80.
Order, R.93-95.
Rule 8, Third District Court Rul^s.

L E L A N D K. W I M M E R
Attorney for Defendant
600 Utah Savings Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 533-0538
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN A N D F O R S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H

GAYLA HATCH,
plaintiff,
S T I P ULA T I O N
-vsCivil No.

MICHAEL HALL HATCH,
defendant.

D - 18898

Plaintiff and defendarthereby stipulate and a g r e e together with t h e i r
r e s p e c t i v e a t t o r n e y s , subject to the approval of the Court, as follows:
1. Defendant h e r e b y consents that his default be entered in this action
by the court, and waives his a p p e a r a n c e in said action.and consent that
plaintiff proceed to a hearing upon h e r complaint in accordance with the follow
ing t e r m s .
2.

Plaintiff shall thereupon p r e s e n t evidence to the court in support of

the allegations of h e r complaint on file h e r e i n .

If the court d e e m s such

evidence sufficient to award to plaintiff a Decree of Divorce from defendant,
then said D e c r e e , subject to the approval of the court, shall provide as
follows:
a.

Plaintiff may be awarded the c a r e , custody and control of the two

minor children of the p a r t i e s , to-wit: J a m e s Craig Hatch and V a n e s s a Kay
Hatch, subject to the right of r e a s o n a b l e visitations by the defendant.

K /f

b.

Plaintiff may be awarded the use of the home and r e a l p r o p e r t y

located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton, Utah, subject to the payment of
the mortgage thereon, until the o c c u r r e n c e of one of the following contingencies, to-wit: The r e m a r r i a g e of plaintiff, the youngest child r e a c h e s
majority, or plaintiff d e s i r e s to sell said home, at which time defendant
shall have first option to p u r c h a s e plaintiff T s equity pursuant to an a p p r a i s a l
to be made forthwith to d e t e r m i n e the equity as of this date, said a p p r a i s a l
to be paid for by defendant, and plaintiff shall have theoption to p u r c h a s e
defendant's equity on the o c c u r r e n c e of any of the above contingencies in the

event defendant does not purchase plaintiff T s equity, said equity to be based
on an a p p r a i s a l and determination as of the date of the o c c u r r e n c e of one of
the above contingencies.

In the event neither party e x e r c i s e s the option to

p u r c h a s e , said home would be sold and defendant would r e c e i v e the equity
pursuant to the D e c r e e of Divorce and the present a p p r a i s a l .
c.

Plaintiff may be awarded as h e r sole and s e p a r a t e property the

furnityre, furnishings and fixtures, the 1970 Buick Riviera automobile and
her p e r s o n a l belongings.
d.

Defendant may be awarded as his sole and s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y the

1968 Dodge pickup and his personal belongings and the personal p r o p e r t y in
his possession and control.
e.

Plaintiff shall be ordered to a s s u m e and discharge the obligation due

F a r m Home Administration on the mortgage on the hom$ and defendant shall
be ordered to assume and discharge all other debts and obligations as set

£ i ? 4 lb

forth by the divorce Complaint, as well as any and all other debts and obligations i n c u r r e d p r i o r to filing of this divorce, by the p a r t i e s during t h e i r
marriage.
f.

Defendant shall be o r d e r e d to pay to plaintiff the sum of $100. 00 per

child p e r month, for the support and maintenance of the two m i n o r children
of the parties*
g.

Defendant shall be o r d e r e d to maintain medical i n s u r a n c e on the

minor children and maintain his p r e s e n t life i n s u r a n c e naming the m i n o r
children as beneficiaries thereon, through operation e n g i n e e r s so long as
defendant is elegable to do so.
h.

Plaintiff shall be awarded no alimony.

i.

Plaintiff a g r e e s to continue existing m a r r i a g e counseling,

j.

Each party shall a s s u m e and pay t h e i r own attourney fees and court

costs.
DATED this

Q &\y

day of * / ^ H > ^ y , t U l /

il \L

1975

GAYLA HATCH, Plaintiff

/

^

/

NOLAN-J. OLSEN,
Attorney for Plaintiff

MICHAEL HALL HATCH, Defendant

new

K Mf\imc.\

LELAND K. WIMMER,
Attorney for Defendant
Utah Savings Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

0000]7

17

NOLAN J. OLSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
255.7176
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GAYLA HATCH,
Plaintiff,
-vs.

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

MICHAEL HALL HATCH,

:
Civil No. D.18898

Defendant.

:

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing
on the 21st day of November, 1975, before this court, the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., Judge presiding, and the plaintiff having appeared
in person and by her attorney, Nolan J. Olsen, and the defendant and his
attorney, Leland K. Wimmer, having consented in a Stipulation dated the
6th day of November, 1975, that plaintiff may proceed to present her
evidence without further notice, and the court having read and approved
the Stipulation on file herein, and the plaintiff having been sworn and
testified concerning the allegations of her Complaint, and the court
having been fully advised in the premises, and upon motion of Nolan J.
Olsen, attorney for plaintiff, the court makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

Plaintiff and defendant were actual and bona fide residents

rt T> >

of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months
immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

That the Complaint herein has been on file for more than

ninety (90) days.
3.

Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband, having been

married at Elko, Elko County, State of Nevada, on the 16th day of
December, 1962.

4.

Plaintiff and defendant have two (2) minor children as issue

of this marriage, to.wit:

James Craig Hatch, born May 30, 1967, and

Vanessa Kay Hatch, born November 22, 1970.
5.

That the aforementioned children are in the care, custody

and control of the plaintiff, who as their mother is a fit and proper
person to be awarded their care, custody and control, subject to the
right of reasonable visitations by the defendant.
6.

During the course of this marriage, the defendant has

treated the plaintiff cruelly by being argumentative, by remaining away
from the home of the parties for long and unreasonable times, and by
various and other conduct, which has caused the plaintiff great mental
anguish, physical distress and suffering.
7.

It is fair and reasonable that plaintiff be awarded the

use of the home and real property located at 13227 South 2860 West,
Riverton, Utah, subject to the payment of the mortgage thereon, until
the occurrence of one of the following contingencies, to-wit:

the

remarriage of plaintiff, the youngest child reaches majority, or the
plaintiff desires to sell said home, at which time defendant shall have
first option to purchase plaintiff* s equity pursuant to an appraisal to

be made forthwith to determine the equity as of this date, said appraisal
to be paid for by defendant, and plaintiff shall have the option to
purchase defendants equity on the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the event defendant does not purchase plaintiff's equity,
said equity to be based on an appraisal and determination as of the date of
the occurrence of one of the above contingencies.

In the event neither

party exercises the option to purchase, the home shall be sold and
defendant shall receive the equity pursuant to the Decree of Divorce
and the present appraisal.
8.

It is fair and reasonable that plaintiff be awarded as

her sole and separate property the furniture, furnishings and fixtures,
the 1970 Buick Riviera automobile and her personal belongings, and it
is fair and reasonable that defendant be awarded as his sole and

separate property the 1968 Dodge pickup and his personal belongings and
the personal property in his possession and control.
9.

It is fair and reasonable that plaintiff be ordered to

assume and discharge the obligation due Farm Home Administration on the
mortgage on the home, and it is fair and reasonable that defendant be
ordered to assume and discharge the obligations due Walker Bank and Trust
Company, two accounts, $950.00 and $1,000.00, liens on the 1970 Buick
automobile and the 1968 Dodge pickup; Sears, $300.00; Walker Bankard,
$350.00; Alden's, $250.00; and any and all other debts and obligations
incurred by the parties during their marriage up to the date of the
filing of the Complaint herein on July 18, 1975, and hold plaintiff
harmless therefrom.

10.

It is fair and reasonable that defendant be ordered to pay

to plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per child per month, a total of $200.00
per month, for the support and maintenance of the two minor children of
the parties.
11.

It is fair and reasonable that plaintiff be awarded no

12.

It is fair and reasonable that defendant be ordered to

alimony.

maintain medical insurance on the two minor children, and to maintain
his present life insurance naming the minor children as beneficiaries
thereon.
13.

It is fair and reasonable that each party be ordered to

assume and pay their own attorney fees and court costs.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

Plaintiff should be granted a Decree of Divorce on the

grounds of mental cruelty.
2.

Plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and control

of the two minor children of the parties, subject to the right of
reasonable visitations by the defendant.

3.

Plaintiff and defendant should be awarded property as set

forth in the Findings of Fact above.
4.

Plaintiff and defendant should be ordered to assume and

discharge the debts and obligations as set forth in the Findings of
Fact above.
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5.

Defendant should be ordered to pay to plaintiff the sura of

$100*00 per child per month, a total of $200.00 per month, for the support
and maintenance of the two minor children of the parties.
6.

Plaintiff should be awarded no alimony.

7.

Defendant should be ordered to maintain medical insurance

on the minor children, and to maintain his present life insurance naming
the minor children as beneficiaries thereon.
8.

That each party should be ordered to assume and pay their

own attorney fees and court costs.
DATED this

r.^AL

<*ay of

, 1975.

BY THE COURT:

*f
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Cfy,

NOL^N J. OLSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
255.7176
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

G A Y L A HATCH,

Plaintiff,

:

:
MICHAEL HALL HATCH,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

1&\<13b K\o.q4S

:
Civil No* D.18898

Defendant.

:

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing
on the 21st day of November, 1975, before this court, the Honorable
Stewart M« Hanson, Sr., Judge presiding, and the plaintiff having appeared
in person and by her attorney, Nolan J. 01 sen, and the defendant and his
attorney, Leland K. yimmer, having consented in a Stipulation dated the
6th day of November, 1975, that plaintiff may proceed to present her
evidence without further notice, and the court having read and approved
the Stipulation on file herein, and the plaintiff having been sworn and
testified concerning the allegations of her Complaint, and the court
having been fully advised in the premises, and the court having hereto,
fore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
upon motion of Nolan J» Olsen, attorney for plaintiff,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between
the plaintiff, GAYLA HATCH, and the defendant, MICHAEL HALL HATCH, be,
and the same are hereby dissolved, providing, however, that the Decree
shall not become final until three (3) months from the date hereof,
during which time neither of the parties hereto shall remarry, which
Decree will become final without further notice or proceedings, unless
either of the parties hereto or the court on its own motion shall

institute further proceedings herein.
2.

Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded the care, custody

and control of the two (2) minor children of the parties, tcwit:

James

Craig Hatch, born May 30, 1967, and Vanessa Kay Hatch, born November 22,
1970, subject to the right of reasonable visitations by the defendant.
3.

Defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff

the sum of $100.00 per child per month, a total of $200.00 per month, for
the support and maintenance of the two (2) minor children of the parties.
4.

Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded no alimony.

5.

Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded the use of the

home and real property located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton, Utah,
subject to the payment of the mortgage thereon, until the occurrence of
one of the following contingencies, to.wit:

the remarriage of plaintiff,

the youngest child reaches majority, or the plaintiff desires to sell
said home, at which time defendant shall have first option to purchase
plaintiff*s equity pursuant to an appraisal to be made forthwith to

determine the equity as of this date, said appraisal to be paid for by
defendant, and plaintiff shall have the option to purchase defendants
equity on the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the
event defendant does not purchase plaintiff*s equity, said equity to be
based on an appraisal and determination as of the date of the occurrence
of one of the above contingencies.

In the event neither party exercises

the option to purchase, the home shall be sold and defendant shall receive
the equity pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the present appraisal*
6.

Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property the furniture, furnishings and fixtures, the 1970
Buick Riviera automobile and her personal belongings, and defendant be,
and he is hereby awarded as his sole and separate property the 1968
Dodge pickup and his personal belongings and the personal property in
his possession and control.
7.

Plaintiff be, and she is hereby ordered to assume and

discharge the obligation due Farm Home Administration on the mortgage
on the home, and defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to assume and
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discharge the obligations due Walker Bank and Trust Company, two accounts,
$950.00 and $1,000,00, liens on the 1970 Buick automobile and the 1968
Dodge pickup; Sears, $300.00; Walker Bankard, $350.00; Alden's, $250.00;
and any and all other debts and obligations incurred by the parties during
their marriage up to the date of the filing of the Complaint herein on July
18, 1975, and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom.
8.

Defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to maintain medical

insurance on the two minor children, and to maintain his present life
insurance naming the minor children as beneficiaries thereon.
9.

Plaintiff and defendant be, and they are each ordered to

assume and pay their own. attorney fees and court costs.
DATED

All1 day of
this4
.^^
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^

n T
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, 1975.

BY THE COURT:
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NOLAN J. OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 2464
OLSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-7176
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GAYLA HATCH (ANDERSON),
AFFIDAVIT FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. D-18898
MICHAEL HALL HATCH,
Judge
Defendant«

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss

County of Salt Lake)
GAYLA HATCH (ANDERSON), being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

That she is the plaintiff in the above entitled action.

2.

That she was granted a Decree of Divorce on November 21, 1975.

3.

That pursuant to said Decree of Divorce, paragraph 7, defendant

was awarded an equitable interest in said home, said sum being the sum of
38,408.89 together with one-half (\)

of the value of water stock which

value is the sum of $112.50, a total being $8,521.39.
4.

That plaintiff on or about April 7, 1984, made arrangements

for a loan to pay said sum, however, defendant failed and refused to sign
a Quit Claim Deed and receive his money.
5.

That on October 1984, plaintiff" had her attorney remit to

defendant, a letter requesting a closing and defendant failed and refused
to provide notice to plaintiff's counsel agreeing to said closing.

<L^

6.

That it has been necessary for plaintiff to employ counsel

in bringing this action.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that an Order to Show Cause be made
and entered by the Court requiring plaintiff to show cause, if any he may
have:
1.

Why he should not execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property

located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton, Utah, and place said Quit
Claim Deed in escrow and accept the sum of $8,529.39 as his equity in
the home and real property pursuant to the Divcrce Decree.
2.

Why plaintiff should not be granted judgment against the

defendant for reasonable attorney's fees for the use and benefit of
plainti£f*s counsel herein.
DATED this J ?

day of APRIL, 1985.

$(Q/AL

JJgjfiM

(Zr$JW*)

GAYLA^iATCH (ANDERSON)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me t h i s ^

_day of APRIL, 1985,

7ffrjy

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing
a~k-*
Residing ^atr*

44?

/

,

/>A /

/ / '/i

CoiUirtylfef?Salt:Lake - State of Utah
FILE NO.
TITLE:

COUNSEL:

( • PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL PRESENT)

F:

lAcgdcK

^=>cu

(•

\JS

Uckml

\r\aU

lr\cdx^\

c?\. oc)CLERK
JUDGI

REPORTER

DATE:

BAILIFF

"filouVrk/l'S

iQA^JM

skbuld
^VTfcivc<Lo

CQUINUI

^6>p-€CUaC

t

fa

/oKooO

CflX(^e

aualO/'lii:,
A-JLcg^oQgut

IJ

=4

f)&06yia.

Cc^>

v j u u l i i i i

^A2 < V < ^
PAGE

i£- 5-1

0F_

' \? ^ . . ? ^ ^ S . O F F : C E
"
*n
<JFD o 3
t v/f *-'-• ^ o 'yji
*^ft&te/l&1
Rf_/ __

Frank P. Pignanelli (4392)
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Defendant
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:

(801) 532-6996
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
GAYLA HATCH (ANDERSON),
Plaintiff,

VERIFIED MOTION TO COMPEL
DEFENDANT TO EXECUTE
QUIT-CLAIM DEED AND REQUESTING
CLARIFICATION OF DECREE

MICHAEL HALL HATCH,

Civil No. D-18898
Judge

Defendant.
ooOoo

•

COMES NOW the Plaintiff Gayla Hatch Anderson, by and through
the undersigned counsel of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, and
hereby moves this Court for an Order compelling Defendant to
execute a Quit-Claim Deed on the property located at 13 227 South
2860 West, Riverton, Utah, and accept the sum of $8,529.39 as his
equity in the home and real property pursuant to the Decree of
Divorce entered in the above-entitled matter and, further, for an
Order from this Court clarifying and determining the present and
future rights of Plaintiff and Defendant in regards to the
above-described property.
This Motion is based upon, but not limited to, the
following:

(L'JI

1.

Plaintiff was granted a Decree of Divorce on November

21, 1975.
2.

Prior to the Default Hearing on November 21, 1975,

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an Agreement and Stipulation
which provided for, among other things, how the parties' marital
residence was to be disposed of and provided for in an equitable
fashion.
3.

The Plaintiff's former counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, prepared

a Stipulation (attached as Exhibit "A," incorporated by reference
herein), and in accordance to Plaintiff's instructions, said
Stipulation, provided that Plaintiff would have the first option
to purchase Defendant's equity in the parties' marital residence
in the event the established contingencies were to occur.
4.

The Plaintiff, never waivered from her instructions to

her previous counsel that the above-described disposition of the
home should be set forth in the Decree of Divorce.
5.

The Plaintiff, on the instructions of her previous

counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, signed a Stipulation which was
eventually entered and filed with this Court, and Plaintiff was
never notified that said Stipulation contained language which
varied from her above-described intent and understanding as to
the disposition of the parties' marital residence.
6.

That the language contained in paragraph 5 of the Decree

of Divorce entered by this Court on November 21, 19^5, did not
accurately reflect Plaintiff's intent and understanding as to the
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disposition of the parties' marital residence pursuant to the
Agreement and Stipulation Plaintiff and Defendant entered into.
7.

That it is Plaintiff's understanding that she was to

have the first option to purchase Defendant's equity as of the
date of the Decree of Divorce, and that ^Defendant would have the
option to purchase Plaintiff's equity in the event that Plaintiff
did not purchase Defendant's equity on the occurrence of the
described contingencies.
8.

That it is Plaintiff's belief and understanding that it

is standard practice that the party who assumes the mortgage and
continues to live in the marital residence has the first option
to buy out the other party in the event of one of the
contingencies to occur, and it was this standard practice that
Plaintiff wished to have incorporated into the Decree of Divorce
on November 21, 1975.
9.

That Plaintiff, in accordance with her understanding of

paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, arranged for an appraisal
of said home around the date that said Decree was entered, and
said appraisal appraised Defendant's equity as of November, 1975,
to be $8,408.49.
10.

That based upon the circumstances surrounding the

preparation of the final Stipulation and final Decree of Divorce,
it is the belief of Plaintiff that paragraph 5 in the Decree of
Divorce contains several typographical errors which transpose
Defendant and Plaintiff, thus creating the now confusing result.

<<r<i

11.

Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, as it now reads,

provides that Plaintiff is awarded the use of the parties'
marital residence until she desires to sell the said home, at
which time the Defendant will have the first option to purchase
Plaintiff's equity pursuant to an appraisal made as of the date
of the Decree of Divorce.
12.

That Plaintiff, on February 2, 1981, and again on

August 10, 1981, listed the said property to be put on the market
for sale (as evidenced by Exhibit "B,!f incorporated by refernece
herein), and Plaintiff advised the Defendant of such listings.
13.

That Defendant, upon being advised of Plaintiff's

listing of the parties1 marital residence, did not attempt to
exercise the above-described option to purchase Plaintiff's
equity.
14.

That it is Plaintiff's belief that because of

Defendant's failure to exercise his option under paragraph 5 of
the Decree of Divorce, he has hereby waived the same.
15.

That Plaintiff, on March 26, 1984, married Terry

Anderson, and notified the Defendant of her marriage to Mr.
Anderson.
16.

That paragraph 5 of the above-described Decree of

Divorce, provides that upon the remarriage of Plaintiff,
Defendant shall have the first option to purchase Plaintiff's
equity pursuant to the appraisal made as of the date of the entry

£&o
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of the Decree of Divorce, and Plaintiff shall have the option to
purchase Defendant's equity if the Defendant fails to do so.
17.

That it is the belief and understanding of Plaintiff,

that Defendant, having been notified of Plaintiff's marriage to
Mr. Anderson, has failed to exercise his option to purchase her
equity in said home, and has hereby waived the same.
18.

That pursuant to said Decree of Divorce, Defendant was

awarded an equitable interest in said home, said sum being the
sum of $8,408.89, together with one-half of the value of water
stock, which value is the sum of $112.50, for a total of
$8,521.39.
19.

Plaintiff, on or about April 7, 1984, and Defendant

having waived his option on three separate occasions to purchase
Plaintiff's equity, made arrangements for a loan to pa^
Defendant's equity and water stock value; however, Defendant
failed and refused to sign a Quit-Claim Deed and receive his
money.
20.

That on several occasions, Plaintiff has requested

Defendant to cooperate in the accepting of the loan, and
assigning of the Quit-Claim Deed, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the
Decree of Divorce.
21.

Defendant has failed and refused to comply with the

above-described terms and conditions of the Decree of Divorce.
22.

At paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, it states that

value of the equity to be purchased by either party v/ill be based

tz y

upon an appraisal to be made "forthwith to determine the equity
as of this date . . . . n
23.

That paragraph 5 of the Decree of divorce states

farther on that the equity is to be based on an appraisal and
determination "as of the date of the occurrence of one of the
above contingencies,"
24.

That it is the belief and understanding of Plaintiff,

that it is a standard practice that an appraisal is to be
conducted at the time the Decree of Divorce is entered, if one of
the parties is to assume the mortgage and continues to reside in
the residence, and Plaintiff desired that said practice would be
incorporated in the Decree of Divorce.
25.

That it is the belief and understanding of Plaintiff

that it would be unfair to the latter interpretation of the
valuation of the equity to occur in that in the last ten years
since the parties1 divorce, she has maintained all the mortgage
payments, property taxes, insurance premiums, all house
improvement expenses, and to award Plaintiff one-half of this
valuation is both grossly unfair and does not reflect what the
parties intended at the time of the divorce.
26.

The Plaintiff desires of this Cour^: a clarification and

determination as to the equity valuation contained in paragraph 5
of the Decree of Divorce.
27.

That Plaintiff has been required to employ counsel in

the bringing of this action, and that costs and attorneys1 fees

in the maintenance of this action should be awarded to her in the
form of a judgment against Defendant.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully moves the Court:
1.

For an Order requiring Defendant to execute a Quit-Claim

Deed on the property located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton,
Utah, and to accept the sum of $8,529.39 as his equity in the
home and real property pursuant to the above-described Decree of
Divorce.
2.

For an Order from this Court clarifying and determining

the rights of the parties in regards to the option requirements
as to the disposition of the parties1 marital residence, and as
to the date of when an appraisal must have been conducted to
value the parties1 equity at the time of the Decree of Divorce.
3.

For an Order granting judgment against the Defendant for

reasonable attorneysf fees and costs incurred in the maintenance
of this action.
4.

For such proper and other relief necessary under the

circumstances.
DATED this

£3

day of September, 19 85.
GUSTIN, ATOMS ,CASTING & LI APIS

By // / K W ^ ^ / L Fra'njk R. P i g n a n e l l i

I
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State of Utah

)
:
County of Salt Lake )

ss.

Gayla Hatch Anderson, being first duly sworn under oath,
deposes and says:
That she is the Plaintiff in the above-fentitled matter and
has read the foregoing Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to
Execute Quit-Claim Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree
and knows the contents thereof and that the same is true of
Plaintiff's own knowledge except as to those matters stated upon
information and belief, and, as to those matters, Plaintiff
believes them to be true.

\£ El
GAYLA
HATCH ANDERSON

X ^
jfeaay
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /
'day of Sept*
September,
1985.

XLA

/6^U

Notary Public
Residing at Salt La

My commission expi

ihltx

VL/>4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to
Execute Quit-Claim Deed and Request for Clarification of Decree
was rinly ma-ilpr! by plan'ng thp qamp~4.tL~.4-hQ Unitnri fltatas Maj-ls,

gj3^t~age~p-rcpaidrat Salt Lake City, Utah, addressed to:
Leyland K. Wiramer, Esq,
Attorney at Law
604 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
lis ' £^?
l^> day of September, 1985.
DATED this

(LU?

HOLAtf J« 0L5EH
Attornay for Plaintiff
SX33 South Stgta 8tract
Midvala? Utah 84047
253*7176
IK THS DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT^ IN AHD FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

GAYLA BATCH,

STIPULATION

Plaintlfft
•va»
HlCHASL HALL HATCH,

Civil Ho. 0*18898
Dafandant*

It la haraby atipulatad and agraad by « d batvaan plaintiff and
dafandant paraonally and thair raapactlva counaal am follovai
It

Dafandant haraby conaanta that hla dafault ba antarad In this

action by tha court# and vaivea hla appaaranca In aald action* Dafandant
furthar waivaa tha ninaty (90) day waiting pariod and tha thraa (3) ©ouch
lntarlocutary pariod following tha granting of tha Dacraa harein•
2* Plaintiff ahall tharaupon praaant avidanca to tha court in
aupport of tha allagatlona of har Cosplalnt on fiia harain* If tha court
daaata atsch aridauaa auffldant to ward to plaintiff a Dacraa of Divorca £rcn
dafandant, than Mid Dacraa, aubjact to tha approval of tha court, ahall
provlda aa follcwat
a* Plaiatlff nay ba awardad tha car a, cuatody and control of the
two minor childran of tha partiaaf to^wlti

Ji&aa Craig Uatch and Vanaaaa K*y

Hatch, tubject to tha right of raaaonabla vlaltatlona by tha dafandant*

v£U(?

b#

Plaintiff »*7 ba wax dad tha usa of tba ho&a and raal property

locatad at U227 laath 2860 Vest, tlrertxm, Utah, subject to tha payment of
the aortgaga tfesrtoa* until tba occurranca of cma of tba following contingenciei
ccuwita

tba reearrisge of p l a i n t i f f $ tba youngest child raac.ss majority, or

p l a i n t i f f desires to aall said hcnef at which tint p l a i n t i f f shall have
f i r s t optica to purchaaa defendant's equity pursuant to an appraisal to b*
msde forthwith to determine tha ecjuity aa of t h i s data t aaid sppraisal to

ba paid for by defendant^ snd dafandsnt shall h**s tba option to purchaaa
plaintiff*a equity on tba occurrence of sny of tha abova contingencies in tha
event plaintiff doaa not purchaaa defandant'a equity» aaid equity to ba basad
on sa appraisal and datarmination aa of tha data of tba oceurranca of ona of
tba abova contl&gemciaa*

In tba event neither party exarciaa tha option to

purchaaa said hoaa would ba sold and dafendant would racaiva tba aquity
pursuant to tha Dacrea of Divorce and tha prasant sppralaal*
a*

Plaintiff may ba awarded aa bar sola and asperate property tha

furniture, furnishings and fixtures, tba 1970 Bulck Riwlara autoaobllo snd bar
personal belcmglngs*
d«

Dafendant migr ba awarded as his sola snd separate property the

196* Dodge pickup and his paraonal belonging!*
at

Plaintiff shall ba ordered to aaetraa snd discharge tha oblig*_

tion due Faraars Adsdnlatratlen on tba eortgtge an tba hose* and dafendant
shall ba ordered to aaauma snd discharge a l l otter debte snd obligations as
sat forth by the divcrca Coepleint, as wall «> any end all other debts zixd
obligations incurred by tha parties durirg their marrltge and hold p l a i n t i f f
haralaaa therafrcau

f*

Defendant shall he ordered to pay to plaintiff the sua of

9130*00 pay child par aoathf a total of $300*00 par month, far tha support
and naintonanca of tha tiro olnor childron of tha pertiec*
g* fleiatiff shall ha awarded no allaeny*
h* Defendant shall ha ordered to maintain eadical insursnca on
tha sdao* childron ond maintain his present Ufa insurance aaoritag tha minor
children aa henaflclarles thereon*
1* Defendant shall ha ordered to pay $330*00 additional attorney
faaa to plaintiff's counsel herein*
OtfSD this

day of

» if 73#

SAYU UAWH,

MUUN

Plalntifi

J. OLSai, Attorn*? lor PlalutiXf

HlfflAEL HALL HAKH,' KtftaCni
IZUHtt K.' UIWiKfl, ltteroay !©r"T>«f aslant
Utah Savings Bldf., fait Lata City, Utah

!<lb7
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"•^
Attorney for Defendant
^*-L^< «*
604 Judge building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 533-0538
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H/Gitf.
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************************************^i************
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIALJDISTRICT,
IN A N D F O R SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH
ORDER UPON HEARING OF

GAYLA HATCH,
plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S ORDER TO SHOW
-vs-

CAUSE
MICHAEL HALL HATCH,
defendant.

Civil No. 18898

************************************************

Plaintiff 1 s Order to Show Cause came on for hearing before the
Honorable Sandra Peuler, Commissioner on the 9th day of May A . D . 1985.
Parties were present and represented by each of their respective attorneys
of record. After arguments of counsel and review of the file the Court
being fully advised in the matter now on motion of Leland K. Wimmer i t i s
hereby

ordered

that the relief requested by plaintiff's Order to Show

Cause be denied.
DATED this

/J
y

day o L K u g & t A . D . 1985.

By t h e C o u r t ,
Recommen
Sandra Peuler, Commissioner

H. DiXCN'-

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy bFffig foreaorngOrder Upon Hearing of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause to Gayla Hatch a / k / a
Gayla Hatch Anderson at 13227 South 2860 W e s t , Riverton, Utah 84065,

^ic,vvf{

tZdo

K 'J
nr

FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Salt Lako Cour.tv Utah

FILMED

I W IS J986
H D»>W^^

FRANK R. PIGNANELLI (4392)
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996

By
Oeoutv Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo

—

GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. D-18898

MICHAEL HALL HATCH,

Judge Dee

Defendant,
ooOoo

>—

Defendant's Objection to Commissioner Sandra Peuler's
September 30, 1985, Memorandum Decision in the above-entitled
matter having come on regularly for hearing on November 6, 1985,
at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable David B. Dee, one of the
Judges of the above-entitled Court, and Plaintiff appearing in
person and by and through her counsel, and Defendant having
appeared in person by and through his counsel, and the Court
having heard argument from counsel, and the Court being further
advised on the premises and upon the Motion of Frank R.
Pignanelli of GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for
Plaintiff;
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS:

&<?>

1.

That the intent of the Decree of Divorce entered by

this Court on November 21, 1975, as evidenced by the Stipulation,
is that the Defendant is to receive the one-half share of his
equity based upon the amount of equity existing at the time of
the Decree•
2r

That the Defendant is to receive his share of the

equity in the parties marital residence at such time as the
Plaintiff exercises the option to purchase Defendant's share of
the equity, or upon the occurrence of one of the contingencies
listed in Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce.
3.

That if Defendant purchases Plaintiff's share of equity

in the parties marital residence, Plaintiff's equity is to be
determined as of the date of the occurrence of the listed
contingency in paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce.
4.

That the Recommendations contained in Commissioner

Peuler's September 30, 1985, Memorandum Decision in the
above-entitled matter are affirmed. >,
DATED this /^

day of ^Liutu^, 19 86.
BY THE COUBT:

mr2rw-<*

District Court Judge^ ,-

H. D I A O N i-iiiMOLEY
;
. ^ CLERK, A

&q4

S^"2t LJLI "A': E ' r - MAILING
I here! . rertii

ir.c- ,- t: ^

-

— r n C ~ - — '"'ripv w ^ c u . . mailed :*
wi ^ I c . , .

wL«

* *acmq tne &a. .t

r*"auijcxxv.

adiressed *
:.t?Jai

-

^-.i.ii.

,

iSsq.

*;G4 Judge Building
Salt Lake City '-^aDATED this

iriM

-

1

day oi February, 198 6.

uu/ic

w-,-^

e
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r
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RULE 5

Third District Local Rules

or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen
(15) days or such shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(b) Copies of the proposed order, judgment or
decree in civil and domestic cases shall be served on
opposing counsel before being presented to the court
for signature unless approved as to form by opposing counsel, or the court otherwise orders. Notice
of objections thereto shall be filed with the court
and served on opposing counsel no later than five
(5) days after service of said proposed order, judgment or decree.
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be
reduced to writing and presented to the court for
signature within fifteen (15) days of the settlement
and dismissal.
(d) Default judgments:
Default judgments which require a judge's signature shall be submitted to the judge assigned to the
case. Default judgments which* include an award of
attorney's fees shall be supported by an attorney's
fee affidavit which sets forth: (1) the legal basis for
the award of the attorney's fees requested; (2) the
amount requested; and (3) evidence that the amount
requested constitutes a fair and reasonable fee for
the services performed.
RULE 5. PRETRIAL CALENDAR.
This rule modifies Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the
State of Utah.
(a) Pretrial hearings in civil cases will be held
when so ordered by the court. Pretrial hearings will
be held before the judge who has been assigned the
case. Motions for pretrial hearings may be filed at
any time. Such motions shall set forth with particularity why a pretrial hearing is requested. The
Court may order in any case that such motions must
be accompanied by a proposed pre-trial order in
the format set out in the Rules of Practice of the
District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah; or
that such a pretrial order be prepared before a final
settlement conference or trial date is set.
RULE 6. JURY TRIALS - CIVIL.
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Practice in the District
Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah shall
not apply in the Third Judicial District Court.
(a) Cases will be set for jury trial only upon the
filing of a written demand for jury trial and the
payment of the required statutory fee deposited with
the clerk of court within the time provided herein.
Such written demand for jury trial and the payment
of the required statutory fee must be filed no later
than ten (10) days prior to trial or at such other
time as the trial judge may order. The court may in
its discretion, upon motion, order a trial by jury of
any or all issues.
RULE 7. MOTIONS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL
PROCEEDINGS.
Motions for supplemental proceedings will be set
on the regular weekly supplemental proceedings
calendar before a clerk of the court. Counsel may
alternatively schedule the matter to be heard before
the judge assigned to the case on the assigned
judge's regular law and motion calendar.
RULE 8. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COMMISSIONER.
(a) A Domestic Relations Commissioner may be
appointed for the purpose of assisting the court in
domestic relations matters as directed by the court.
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(b) All domestic relations matters, including
orders to show cause, pretrial conferences, petitions
for modification of a divorce decree, scheduling
conferences, and all other applications for relief,
except ex parte motions, shall be referred to the
Domestic Relations Commissioner before any
hearing may be scheduled before the assigned District Court Judge, unless otherwise ordered by the
assigned judge.
(c) The Commissioner shall, after hearing any
motion or other application for relief, recommend
entry of an order thereon, and shall further make a
written recommendation as to each matter heard.
Should the parties not consent to the recommended
order, the matter shall be referred for further disposition by the assigned judge.
(d) Any party objecting to the recommended
order or seeking further hearing before the assigned
judge shall, within five (5) days of the entry of the
Commissioner's recommendations provide notice to
the Commissioner's office and opposing counsel
that the recommended order is not acceptable or
that further hearing is desired. The Commissioner
shall then refer the matter to the assigned judge for
further hearing, conference or triahjfjio objection
or requesffor' further Heafjng3s^made within five (5)
daysT^aicTparty shall- beTcieemed to have consented
to entry of an order in conformance with the
Commissioner's recommendation.
(e) All recommendations of the Commissioner
accepted by the parties shall be presented to the
court and opposing counsel pursuant to Rule 4 of
these Rules. All proposed judgments, orders and
decrees must be approved as to form by the signature of the Commissioner before presentation to the
assigned judge in the case.
(0 Any party obtaining a temporary restraining
order or other temporary order pending a hearing
shall be responsible for obtaining from the assigned
judge any extension thereof before the expiration
date as may be necessary pending hearing before the
Commissioner of the assigned judge.

RULE 9. PROBATE.
(a) The probate calendar will be assigned to a
District Court Judge in Salt Lake County on a rotating assignment basis each January and July 1.
(b) Pursuant to Utah Uniform Probate Code,
Sections 75-1-201 and 75-1-307, the judge
assigned to the probate division of the Third Judicial District Court is appointed registrar to act in
that capacity as required.
(c) The probate clerk pursuant to Section 75-1401, Utah Uniform Probate Code is granted authority to order and schedule dates for hearing and to
prepare the probate calendar of matters to be heard
by the judge assigned to the probate division of the
court.
(d) Pursuant to Sections 75-1-102(1) and 75-1102(2) Utah Uniform Probate Code, the probate
clerk is authorized to use the signature stamp of the
assigned probate judge on informal matters presented to the court for handling.
RULE 10. ADOPTIONS.
(a) The adoption calendar will be assigned to a
Distnct Court Judge in Salt Lake County on a rotating assignment basis each January and July 1.
_ (b) Pursuant to Section 78-30-14, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, pertaining to a
request by the court for the Division of Family
Services to verify the petition and conduct an investigation in adoptions, the petitioners shall, sixty
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